cular, the role played by external financing. That such constraints exist for developing countries has been emphasized by Peacock and Wiseman,3 and for developing countries, Heller has stressed that:
In a highly developed country, tax policy tends to accept the level of expenditures as its revenue goal ... The sequence of decision tends to run from expenditures to tax. But in underdeveloped countries, the level of expenditures depends much more heavily on the ability of the tax system to place required revenues at the disposal of the government ... in this sense the sequence tends to run from taxation to expenditure. 4 In the following section, an attempt will be made to gain some understanding of the effects of revenue constraint and external sources of funding on the patterns of military expenditure in our sample of developing countries.
The data base used for cross-section analysis differs from those used in previous expenditure studies in two respects. First the sample is much larger -the initial data base includes 96 countries. Second, the data base comprises both economic and socio-political variables. Economic variables were taken from the World Bank data base, 5 the International Monetary Fund, 6 and the Yale Data Base on Political and Social Indicators. 7 Military expenditure variables were taken from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 8 
Previous Studies
A more complete formulation of Wagner's law can be stated as follows: in industrializing countries, public sector activities and expenditures grow in relative importance as real per capita income increases. According to Wagner, there are essentially three reasons to expect expanding state activity and expenditures. First, the state has to expand its administrative and protective functions because of the increasing complexity of legal relationships and communications. Second, the state has to expand its activities due to the increase in general public services required by an increasingly affluent society. Third, increases in population and urbanization require higher public expenditures on law and order and economic regulation to maintain the efficient operation of an increasingly complex economy amidst the rising frictions of urban life.
Wagner also predicted a substantial expansion of public expenditure on education and distribution of income. Although his reasons for the expansion of these public activities were unclear in his exposition, Wagner appears to have assumed that they constituted 'superior DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES 297 goods'. In other words, the income elasticity of demand for public services such as education and income redistribution is greater than unity.
A final element in the Wagner framework is the concept that, as industrialization progresses, technological change and large-scale investment expenditures require larger amounts of capital than the private sector can supply. Therefore, the state has to provide the necessary capital to finance large-scale investment projects. Naturally, the 'Law' of expanding state activity has been severely criticized by commentators who argue, for example, that it is wrong to regard the development process as a unique linear trend common to all nations. 9 However, taking the 'Law' at face value and applying it to the present subject matter, we should anticipate a positive correlation between the level of economic development (measured by, for example, per capita income) and the relative size of the defense sector (that is: the defense burden or defense expenditure as a proportion of the national income).
A major test of Wagner's Law was undertaken by Lotz, 10 who investigated several components of public expenditures, of which defense was one. A factor analysis of 37 developing countries (using mid-1960s cross-section data) resulted in Lotz's conclusion that defense spending was not closely related to the particular stage of development.
In order to isolate the determinants of the defense burden (D/Y) Lotz performed a regression analysis on the data and included as independent variables GNP per head (Y /P), mineral and oil exports (MX) which were a proxy for natural resource endowments, the proportion of the population which was urbanized (U) and the total government budget as a share of income (B/Y). The result was as follows:
The final coefficient is exactly in line with the predictions of Wagner's Law: the total budget and the defense budget appear to be positively associated. Furthermore, if we take urbanization as a proxy for the level of economic development, the predicted result is again confirmed. A slightly less statistically sound relationship is observed between defense and natural endowments, although we should expect a close relationship for the obvious reason that nations with abundant natural resources can afford to spend on defense and will also be anxious to protect their wealth from external aggression or internal secessionist movements.
ARMS CONTROL
In spite of these significant results, the anticipated relationship between defense and income does not appear; rather, the relationship is inverse, a result that is confirmed by the value of the correlation coefficient between D/Y and YIP estimated at -0.16. Lotz explains this result by the hypothesis that there exists a certain minimum size for a military establishment, determined by technical factors, which implies a fixed expenditure level irrespective of the size of national income. Smaller, poorer nations have, therefore, been obliged to spend more than their fair share on defense owing to their fears of the mobilization of other more affluent states.
In The first set of correlations suggests that the richer the nation, the more resources it devotes to defense, both being expressed in absolute terms. This relationship is particularly strong for the developed countries and, according to Whynes, is to be expected on an intuitive level -the richer the nation, the more the economy can afford to divert resources away from civil production. The slightly weaker LDC relationship is also consistent with the above but might, too, support the Lotz thesis that a number of the poorer states are obliged to overspend for strategic reasons.
As far as the defense burden is concerned, the DC sample displays quite a strong negative correlation -high burdens are associated with lower, rather than higher, incomes. This apparent reversal of that which was predicted can be explained by considering countries included in the DC sample. First, according to Whynes, many of the medium-to-high income states are members of alliances and this factor is significant. As defense exhibits public goods properties (i.e., if any amount is provided to one member of the group, than it is provided equally to all), defensive alliances are regarded as being efficient in that partners can agree on the provision of the appropriate amount of defense which each may consume and they may then share the costs among themselves. However, once an alliance has been established, it will be in the interests of the members to 'fliee ride', by contributing as small a share of the resources as possible, in the hope that a more risk-adverse or wealthier partner will subsidize them. This is certainly the case in NATO and WTO, where most of the medium-income members contribute less than the average burden of 5 percent and 11 percent, respectively; they are, in fact, heavily subsidized by the extra expenditure undertaken by the USA and USSR (which were not included in Whynes's sample and whose defense burdens exceeded the alliance averages, while their individual strategies dictated that defense escalation must continue).
Second, according to Whynes, several high income states such as Switzerland, Sweden and Japan remain outside the defensive alliances and have not become involved in the arms race, which has to some extent been forced upon NATO and WTO by the superpowers. The requirements of the alliances, which oblige most NATO and WTO members to attempt to 'follow the leaders', mean that the average defense burden in the allied countries is about twice that of unaligned countries (3.5 percent to 1.7 percent).
Third, Whynes noted that several of the low income developing countries possess high defense burdens for a variety of reasons: Israel for obvious reasons, while Greece and Turkey spend relatively large amounts on defense in response to internal turmoil. Others have found it necessary to spend on defense as a result of their exclusion from alliances-Albania, for instance, left WTO in 1968 and now prefers to defend itself in isolation. Both it and Yugoslavia find themselves in a strategically dangerous position on the interface between East and West confrontation. In such cases, isolationism has posed security problems and necessitated correspondingly high levels of defense provision.
In general, Whynes's study found a positive association, as originally hypothesized by Wagner's Law. The relationship is not particularly strong, however, and clearly a number of other factors must be included for a thorough explanation of the observed patterns of defense expenditures.
In a major International Monetary Fund study, 13 it was found that the share of defense expenditures in the total government budget was not associated with per capita income. In general, the study found that the same variables as those influencing general administrative expenses proved to be significant for defense. The most striking difference was that, whereas urbanization had a negative impact on the share in GDP of general administrative expenditures, it has a positive relationship with defense. Defense expenditure, according to this study, could be expected to be higher in a more urbanized country, with a larger proportion of children of 14 years and younger, and a larger public sector (net of defense spending). The study concludes: 14 300 ARMS CONTROL While numerous influences not tested in this study (and indeed impossible to test) must influence defense spending, and while the low correlation coefficient (.15) suggests a large amount of "unexplained" defense expenditure, the significant variables mentioned above are interesting. It seems reasonable to consider that urbanized societies must spend more on defense and are willing to do so. Likewise, it is reasonable to expect that many authorities who are prepared to run a large public sector are also likely to accept the idea that a substantial part of the national budget is being spent on defense.
It should be noted that the IMF study is heavily weighted with advanced industrial countries.
Implications for the Current Study
Based on the literature cited above, a main thesis of the current study is that, while Wagner's Law provides useful insights into the relationship between per capita income and defense expenditures, per capita income is likely to be only one of several factors ultimately determining the level of defense expenditures and their relative share in government budgets. In other words, the determinants of defense expenditures are multidimensional.
The central problem of the cross-section studies is the lack of any historical dimension. While it might certainly be true that there exist certain tendencies toward public sector expansion with development, each country will be following its own particular path through time, encountering its own peculiar economic, political and strategic problems. Countries at a similar stage of development (even assuming that this can be defined) might, therefore, possess completely different sizes of public sector and defense budgets. Examples are Israel and New Zealand, both with per capita incomes of around $3500 but with defense burdens of 33.9 percent and 1.7 percent, respectively. Again, Afghanistan and Bangladesh are, in many ways, similar countries (including an almost identical level of per capita income), yet the farmer's defense burden is nearly four times that of the latter.
The thesis developed below is that previous attempts to explain defense expenditure patterns using cross-section data have failed because they did not systematically incorporate various factors that determine either government budgets or the constraints on financing additional expenditures. By incorporating the financing of government expenditures, the cross-section analysis presented in the following sections is able to capture the historical-environmental dimension lacking in previous studies.
• ! DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES 301 Discriminant Analysis As noted above, several studies 15 have indicated that developing countries may lack homogeneity with regard to either the factors surrounding the decision to increase defense expenditures or the impact that defense expenditures have on the overall economic growth of the country (and thereby feed back to affect their allocation in a later time period). With regard to the impact of defense expenditures on economic growth, Frederiksen and Looney contend that: 16 One can argue that under certain circumstances defense spending can help growth while under a different set of circumstances, it can hinder growth. Indeed, both propositions are likely to be true for the same country at different points in time.
On the positive side, defense spending may contribute to the growth of the civilian economy by: (1) feeding, clothing and housing a number of people who would otherwise have to be fed, housed and clothed by the civilian economy, (2) providing education and medical care as well as vocational and technical training, (3) engaging in a variety of public works -roads, dams, river improvements, airports, communication networks, etc. -that may in part serve civilian uses, and (4) engaging in scientific and technical specialities which would otherwise have to be performed by civilian personnel.
They add that on the negative side:
17 There are at least three different types of possible effects. The first, named the "income shift" by Benoit, is that increases in defense expenditures will reduce the civilian GDP and will thus tend to decrease growth proportionately. Second, it is possible that defense spending adversely affects growth since the government sector for the most part exhibits "negligible rates of measurable productivity increases." Finally, growth can suffer since increased spending on defense uses resources which could have been better employed as civilian investment. Frederiksen and Looney 18 note that while these arguments make intuitive sense, the crucial determinant of the impact of defense expenditures on economic growth is the country's financial resource constraint. According to them, a country which is severely resource constrained (i.e., faces some combination of lagging taxes, reduced private and government savings, reduced borrowing power overseas, export shortfalls, etc.) will probably face budget cuts. In order to maintain defense programs, the high growth development programs will be sacrificed: 302 ARMS CONTROL This is likely for two reasons. First, it is usually more politically acceptable to curtail capital investment (on infrastructure, for example) than expenditures on the current account. Second, given that a well-established military establishment already exists, there will be the obvious pressure to maintain the status quo. These special interest groups might included high ranking officers, military contractors, and certain political groups. As budgets are reduced, the military share is frozen and the brunt of the deflationary policy is borne by development projects which we assume are relatively productive. In short, defense expenditures are likely to be asymmetric -difficult to cut back but easily expanded. Thus, for resource-constrained countries, we should expect a negative relationship between defense spending and economic growth.
The authors contend that the opposite is likely to hold for countries with a relative abundance of financial resources -an elastic supply of tax revenues, a high inflow of foreign exchange and the like: 20 These countries can more easily afford the capital investment programs necessary for economic growth while maintaining or even increasing defense programs.
They conclude that: 21
If this thesis is correct, one can see why previous authors have failed to find any consistency between economic growth and defense. Using a model based on resource constraints, however, it is easy to see why developing countries with identical levels of defense spending can experience very different growth levels: richer countries are apparently able to invest in development programs while, on the other hand, poorer countries have had to sacrifice these programs to pay for defense.
Since their hypothesized relationship between defense and economic growth depended on financial resource constraints, their sample of developing countries was separated into either resource-constrained or non resource-constrained groups by means of cluster analysis. While a large number of conceivable proxy measures could be used to indicate the relative abundance or scarcity of financial resources, the selection of those used in the cluster analysis was based on the ratios of gross domestic invesunent to GDP in 1960 and 1978 and the ratios of gross domestic savings to GDP in 1960 and 1978 (data taken from the 1980 World Bank World Development Report). The cluster analysis produced two distinct groups: one having high levels of savings and investment to GDP, the other having low ratios of savings and investment to GDP.
. Linear regression equations were estimated for each group.
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The most striking result and one that supports our hypothesis, is that the coefficient of the defense variable was positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent level for the richer group. While the coefficient for the defense variables for the poorer group was negative (as hypothesized) it was not statistically different from zero. Based on the above-cited results it makes sense to split the sample of developing countries into groups based on some measure of resource constraint. Presumably, those countries who have either more domestic resources (savings and investment) or more access to foreign capital (everything else equal, such as gross national product) will be able to support a higher level of defense expenditures. On the other hand, those countries with a lower level of domestic resources or less access to international capital will (everything else equal) not have as high a level of defense expenditures. Using factor analysis with a number of measures of debt and capital flows to measure the main trends in the data, a discriminant analysis 23 was performed using as variables those with the highest loading on each one of the individual factors. The orthogonal rotation asssures that each variable selected had a relatively low degree of correlation with the others in the sample. The variables thus selected for splitting the countries into two groups were:
1. (Table 1) show a high degree of probability of correct placement in each group, i.e., the discriminating variables selected from the factor analysis are able to split the sample countries into two fairly distinct groupings based largely on the external debt situation facing each set of countries. Group II countries consist of several major oil exporters and several of the more dynamic newly industrializing nations such as Mexico, Greece, India, Korea, Spain, Algeria and Malaysia. Group I countries in general seem to be the poorer, less economically dynamic nations: this group being heavily weighted with African and poorer Latin American countries.
• 304 ARMS CONTROL Further insight into the two groups can be gained by examining the means (Table 2 ) of the variables used in the discriminant analysis:
1. Group I countries resorted to a much higher (3.6 times) inflow of external public loans in 1982 relative to their exports that year. 2. On the other hand, the overall level of total public external debt in 1982 averages nearly four and one halftimes as much for Group II countries as is the case for Group I countries. 3. The level of international reserves is also much higher for Group II countries -nearly 10 times as much as the average for Group I countries. 4. With regard to shares of debt in gross domestic product, however, Group I countries have much higher levels of attainment, averaging nearly twice as much as Group II countries in both 1970 and 1982. The debt service ratio to exports is correspondingly higher for Group I countries. 5. The rate of growth of imports was nearly ten times higher over the 1970-82 period for Group II countries.
In terms of profiles, therefore, the Group II countries are considerably larger, more affluent, and less reliant on external debt as a percentage of gross domestic product. They tend to spend relatively large amounts on military activities, but not necessarily significantly greater amounts of their overall budgets.
Analysis of Total Military Expenditure
Based on the profiles of the countries in Group I and Group II, one might anticipate that public external debt and external capital flows have played a much greater role in facilitating military expenditures in the former group. The Group II countries appear to be less dependent on external debt and capital flows as a means of maintaining or increasing their military expenditures, i.e., they have more alternative means by which military expenditures can be financed.
To test this hypothesis, total military expenditure was analysed first by factor analysis, then by regression analysis. The factor analysis showed the general manner by which the Group I and Group II countries differ from one another (in terms of the loading of the various measures of military expenditures on economic factors), and how the groups differ individually from the total sample of countries. The regression analysis was undertaken to obtain a more precise delineation and qualification of the economic variables most responsible for the observed differences in military expenditures between countries.
The factor analysis began with the original set of economic variables.
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1. For the total sample of countries, military expenditure (Table  3 ) loads highest at 43 on Factor 3. This particular factor represents the level of gross national reserves and gross national product. As discussed above, the pattern was not particularly clear for the sample as a whole. 2. For the Group I countries, total military expenditure (Table 4) has a loading of 100 on Factor I. This particular factor represents most of the major debt measures-total public debt for 1982, total public debt for 1970 and so on. 3. For Group II countries, total military expenditures loaded highest at 59 on the public debt measures for 1970 (Table 5) , with<\ smaller loading of 51 on export growth and a negative loading of -44 on factors affecting public external debt/exports for 1982.
In sum, the factor analysis of the separate groups of countries produced by the discriminant analysis provided significantly different pictures from those of the sample as a whole of the economic variables associated with total military expenditures. The factor analysis for the total sample of countries indicates that gross national product per capita and international reserves play a large role in affecting military expenditures, while separate analysis of Group I countries indicates a strong association between military expenditure and debt. The Group II countries appear to have more diverse (yet significantly different) patterns linking underlying economic forces to expenditure on defense-related activities. Based on the results of the factor analysis, the number of variables for regression analysis was expanded by adding the main factors upon which military expenditures loaded heavily in the data set.
Step-wise forward regressions indicated that the most important variable affecting total military expenditure for the total sample countries was the share of military expenditure (1981) in total government budget (GEDB), followed by the gross domestic product (GDPB) and then the public external debt in 1970 (PDA). Gross national product per capita (GNPPER) was also significant in the regression equations. Debt service as a percent of exports in 1982 (DEEB) was significant but had a negative sign, as did public external borrowing commitments/ exports in 1982 (PBCB). The most satisfactory equation estimating military expenditures (Equation 9, Table 6 Table 7 , however, indicates that only one country-the Philippines -had a predicted value within 5 percent of the actual level of military expenditure.
Regressions on military expenditure for the Group I countries (Table 8 ) produced, as might be expected, a highly positive correlation between the public debt in 1982 (PDB) and total military expenditures (total public debt in 1982 was not statistically significant in explaining military expenditures for the total sample). As with the total sample, the share of defense expenditures in the total government budget (GEDB) was also statistically significant; however, the size of the standardized coefficient was about twice as large for the total sample as for the Group I countries. Population (POP) is also positively correlated with military expenditures in the Group I countries, as is the net inflow of external loans in 1970 (ECNIA). As with the total sample, the debt service as a proportion of exports in 1982 (DSEB) was statistically significant and negative. Interestingly, the public debt in 1970 (PDA), so important in explaining the pattern of military expenditures for the total sample, is not statistically significant when the regression equation includes population (POP) and net external capital inflows for 1979 (ECNIA).
Regression equations for total military expenditure for the Group II countries (Table 9) found, as with the two previous sample groups, a positive and statistically significant relationship with the share of military expenditures in the total government budget (GEDB). The standardized coefficient for this variable averages around .55 or slightly higher than that for the total sample, but about twice that for Group I countries. Gross domestic product (GDPB) is also statistically significant as is the total public debt in 1970 (PDA), which was not statistically significant for Group I countries. In sharp contrast to Group I, the public debt in 1982 (PDB) is highly significant and negative for Group II, as are population (POP), public external borrowing commitments in 1982 (PBCB), and gross capital inflows/ exports in 1982 (ECIBE).
Group II countries, then, present a picture of countries that borrowed fairly heavily in the early 1970s in order to facilitate military expenditures but who, by the early 1980s, were finding that the debt accumulated at that point in time was, for one reason or another, a hindrance to further expansion in the military budget. Group I countries, however, appear to have used external capital inflows toward the end of the 1970s and early 1980s as a means of increasing the amount of funds allocated to the military sector. Group· I countries might also be using military expenditure as an employment deviceevidenced by the positive sign for population; while Group II countries might be finding that the demands of non-military expenditures (represented by a negative sign for population) caused a reduction in military spending.
The regression equations for Group II (Table 10 ), in contrast with those for the total sample, explain well over 95 percent of the fluctuations in military expenditures for the group as a whole.
Summary-Conclusions
In summary, the basic regression equation for total military expendi-,.
tures shows the following differences by sample group: The results therefore appear to lend strong support to the idea of treating military expenditures in developing countries as being affected by a set of common factors specific to groups of countries, rather than by a set of factors common to developing countries as a whole. It should be noted that the results of the regression presented above for the total sample, Group I, Group II were not significantly affected by the exclusion of the Middle East countries. • ,. 
